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FEAR OF COMMITMENT: AN AFFLICTION
OF ADOLESCENTS
PILIP J. HARTER
I. CONSULTATION AND NEGOTIATION ARE AN INTEGRAL PART
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
Consultations and negotiations between agencies and affected
interests are an essential ingredient of the administrative process if
not of democracy itself. Their critical role has been recognized at
least since the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).' In a now famous passage, the influential Attorney Gen-
eral's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act explained in
1947 that
[t]he settlement of cases and issues by informal methods is noth-
ing new in Federal administrative procedure. In its Final Report,
the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure
pointed out ... that "even where formal proceedings are fully
available, informal procedures constitute the vast bulk of adminis-
trative adjudication and are truly the lifeblood of the administra-
tive process."2
Similarly, the Manual emphasized the importance of informal
conferences (clearly the predecessors of advisory committees) and
consultation in the regulatory process:
[I]nformal rule making procedure may take a variety of forms:
informal hearings (with or without a stenographic transcript),
conferences, consultation with industry committees, submission of
written views, or any combination of these?
1. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994).
2. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRA-
TIV PROCEDURE ACT 48 (1947) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL], reprinted
in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
SOURCEBOOK 97 (1985).
3. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 2, at 31. The Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure was even more descriptive in assessing the role
of negotiation in the development of new rules:
The practice of holding conferences of interested parties in connection with rule
making introduces an element of give-and-take on the part of those present and
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These informal, unstructured processes were then used without
much further development for the succeeding 25 years. Beginning
in the 1970s, however, a number of factors combined to spark a
renewed interest in the use of consultation and negotiation in the
development of rules and other policies. With the emergence of
the regulatory state, it became clear that these informal processes
could result in horrible abuses. In the name of direct participation,
the ability of some to participate in the regulatory process could
effectively be extinguished and major governmental policies unduly
influenced by narrow interests. Thus, if consultative procedures
were to be used, safeguards had to be constructed to protect the
integrity of the resulting decision. The process was suspect without
them, and some viewed it as illegitimate. At the same time, me-
diation began being used to resolve difficult environmental dis-
putes, and structured negotiations were likewise employed in a
variety of policy settings and got good results.4 These activities led
to the development of a body of experience. Another major boost
to the use of mediation came when John Dunlop, a well-known
and experienced mediator of public disputes, became Secretary of
Labor and advocated the use of the model that had proven so suc-
cessful in the labor context as a method for making governmental
decisions.5 Finally, the use of alternative dispute resolution was
beginning to be discussed in legal circles as a means of facilitating
the direct participation of parties in the resolution of issues to
produce results that were both better and more widely accepted.6
In the early 1980s, the Administrative Conference of the Unit-
ed States (ACUS)7 promulgated the first of a series of recommen-
affords an assurance to those in attendance that their evidence and points of
view are known and will be considered. As a procedure for permitting private
interests to participate in the rule making process it is as definite and may be
as adequate as a formal hearing. If the interested parties are sufficiently known
and are not too numerous or too hostile to discuss the problems presented,
conferences have evident advantages over hearings in the development of
knowledge and understanding.
S. Doc. No. 77-8, at 104 (1941).
4. For a review of this experience, see Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A
Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 31-42 (1982).
5. See, eg., John T. Dunlop, The Limits of Legal Compulsion, 27 LAB. L.J. 67
(1976).
6. See, e.g., Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Resolution, Address at the
National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice (The Pound Conference) (Apr. 7-9, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 79, 120-21 (1976) (dis-
cussing the benefits of mediation for parties in long-term relationships).
7. The Administrative Conference of the United States, known generally as ACUS,
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dations on the use of dispute resolution techniques-direct negotia-
tions among the affected interests, mediation, arbitration, and
combinations of these techniques, along with attendant procedures
necessary to make them work.8 These recommendations sought to
combine the benefits of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
with procedures that would ensure the legitimacy of the resulting
decisions; they were built on careful analysis and were vetted
before ACUS's diverse membership. ACUS's recommendations
thus developed the structure for the use of ADR by federal agen-
cies. In addition, ACUS created a series of training programs and
seminars for agencies both to educate agency staff on the benefits
of ADR and to instruct the staff on the successful use of the
techniques in regulatory programs. It also afforded agencies the
opportunity to share experiences.
Although under existing authority agencies were already using
ADR procedures, particularly negotiated rulemaking, fairly regular-
ly, the structured use of direct participation of the affected inter-
ests and other forms of ADR received a major boost when Con-
gress enacted the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act
(ADRA)9 and the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990.10 Both
acts amended the APA, and both lent Congressional imprimatur to
the emerging use of ADR by federal agencies."
The administrative use of ADR is therefore somewhere be-
tween fifteen and twenty years old-in the prime of adolescence.
It is, therefore, appropriate to step back and assess both its cur-
rent status and predict its likely future.
was charged by Congress to "study the ... administrative procedure[s] used by adminis-
trative agencies in carrying out administrative programs, and make recommendations to
[appropriate bodies]." 5 U.S.C. § 594 (1994). Congress terminated ACUS by withdrawing
all funding beginning November 1, 1995.
8. The first of this series was Administrative Conference of the U.S., Recommen-
dation No. 82-4, Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations (codified at 1 C.F.R. §
305.82-4 (1993)).
9. Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of U.S.C. tits. 5, 9, 28, 29, 31, 41).
10. Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.).
11. Both acts contained sunset provisions; the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act
expired five years after its enactment, in 1995, see § 11, while the Negotiated Rulemaking
Act was scheduled to expire in 1996, six years after its enactment, see § 5.
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II. ADJUDICATORY USE OF ADR
The use of alternative means of dispute resolution by federal
agencies is now quite an expansive topic, ranging on both sides of
the great divide of administrative law. On the adjudicatory front,
we could analyze the efficacy of mediating major government
contract disputes; the use of mediation in enforcement actions has
been controversial, and its appropriate employment needs further
refinement, but it is clearly growing. We could look at the use of
mini-trials to resolve a range of issues, and, after the reauth-
orization of the 1990 Act by the Administrative Dispute Resolu-
tion Act of 1996,12 we could speculate on the future use of bind-
ing arbitration. 3 As if these issues weren't enough, we could then
delve into the role of Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) in pro-
viding this suite of services: Are AIJs a logical source of neu-
trals,14 or is one of the benefits of the growing range of proce-
dures that are available to resolve specific issues the fact that the
parties can now choose the one whom they will trust to help re-
solve their controversy?
Certainly the government's use of arbitration is not yet in its
adolescent stage. The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act as
originally introduced authorized agencies to use arbitration only if
all of the parties consented specifically to its use. During the
hearings leading up to passage of the ADRA, however, the De-
partment of Justice (DOJ) argued that it would be unconstitutional
for the United States government to use binding arbitration. 6 Al-
though the analysis was not precise, DOJ's general argument was
that only officers of the United States can make those decisions,
12. Pub. L. No. 104-320, 110 Stat. 3870 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of U.S.C. tits. 5, 28, 29, 41).
13. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 575-581 (1994) (authorizing administrative agencies to enter into
binding arbitrations and enforcing the results of the binding arbitrations).
14. A "neutral" is defined by the ADRA as "an individual who, with respect to an
issue in controversy, functions specifically to aid the parties in resolving the controversy."
Id. at § 571(9). The neutral may serve as a convener, facilitator, mediator, arbitrator, or
in some other position; the term "neutral" is commonly used to refer to the position
generically as one who is disinterested in the outcome of the controversy.
15. See Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 971 Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management of the Senate Comm. on Govern-
mental Affairs, 101st Cong. (1989) [hereinafter ADRA Hearings]. Specifically, the ADRA
prohibits making arbitration agreements a condition of a government contract or other
benefit. See 5 U.S.C. § 575(a)(3) (1994).
16. See ADRA Hearings, supra note 15, at 13 (statement of William P. Barr, Assis-
tant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel).
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and an arbitrator would generally not be appointed by the requi-
site means. 7 The American Bar Association, having adopted a
resolution supporting the use of arbitration by administrative agen-
cies, testified in support of the arbitration provisions and disagreed
with DOJ's theory." To reach closure, however, a compromise
was fashioned by which an agency could agree to binding arbitra-
tion but the award would not become final for a period of thirty
days. During this thirty-day period, the head of the agency, who
holds a non-delegable personal duty, could vacate the award and
thereby nullify it; if the award was vacated, the agency would pay
attorney's fees. Further, to reduce the appearance of impropriety
of trial counsel seeking "two bites at the apple," the principle of
separation of functions would apply to the agency head's
review.' As a result of the opt-out provision, private parties were
simply unwilling to use the arbitration, and the mere existence of
the override seemed to taint the use of ADR under that Act-it
was as if there were a hole in the ice and everyone knew to stay
away from the danger zone.
Subsequently, in a more explicitly considered, formal opinion,
Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel Walter
Dellinger determined that binding arbitration would indeed be
constitutional.' Although DOJ initially testified at the ADRA
17. See id.
18. See id. at 28-38 (statement of Philip J. Harter on behalf of the American Bar
Association). The ABA testified that, under current law, an arbitrator would not be re-
garded as a "principal" officer of the United States, and, thus, does not require
Presidential appointment, since all of the factors that caused the Supreme Court to hold
that an independent prosecutor is not a "principal" officer of the United States likewise
are met by an arbitrator. See adt at 30; see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670-73
(1988) (holding that it does not violate the Appointments Clause for Congress to vest
the power to appoint an independent counsel in the Special Division court created by the
Ethics in Government Act because independent counsel appointees are "inferior" officers
in that: 1) the Attorney General is authorized to remove them; 2) they have limited
duties; 3) they have limited jurisdiction; and 4) they are temporary).
19. See 5 U.S.C. § 580(c), (g) (1994).
20.
You have asked for our opinion as to whether the Constitution in any way lim-
its the authority of the federal government to submit to binding arbitration.
Specifically, you have asked us to explain and expand on advice we issued on
September 19, 1994, in which we confirmed our earlier oral advice that "the
Office of Legal Counsel no longer takes the view that the Appointments
Clause, U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, bars the United States from entering into
binding arbitration." . . . Below, we reiterate this conclusion and, pursuant to
your request, set forth the reasoning by which we reached it. In addition, we
consider, again pursuant to your request, the various other constitutional provi-
sions that may be implicated when the federal government enters into binding
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reauthorization hearings that it preferred to retain the override,2
it subsequently changed its position and did not oppose the autho-
rization of agencies to engage in binding arbitration.' Congress
embraced the concept in its final legislation so that agencies
were authorized to enter into agreements which call for the use of
binding arbitration to resolve issues in controversy. Arbitration
might be expected to be used in at least three situations: the reso-
lution of straightforward government contract claims; cases where
the facts are not complex and the value is not significant to any
party; and the resolution of issues that arise on an ongoing basis
in the implementation of an agreement or contract.24
While it has been retooled and its attractiveness enhanced at
least for private disputants, arbitration is in its infancy. Like an
infant's, arbitration's future is full of hope and promise, but with-
out sufficient experience to get the type of reading one can of an
adolescent-pimples and all.
The ADRA also encourages agencies to use mediation and
other consensual forms of dispute resolution to resolve issues in
controversy. It clarifies the confidentiality provisions in an attempt
arbitration. We conclude that none absolutely bars the federal government from
taking such action.
Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dept. of Justice, to John
Schmidt, Associate Att'y Gen., U.S. Dept. of Justice, regarding Constitutional Limitations
on Federal Government Participation in Binding Arbitration (Sept. 7, 1995) (on file with
Duke Law Journal) (citation and footnotes omitted).
21. See ADRA Hearings, supra note 15, at 13 (statement of William P. Barr, Assis-
tant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel).
22. See Prepared Statement of Peter R. Streenland, Jr., Senior Counsel, Office of Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution, Dep't of Justice, Before the House Judiciary Comm.
Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law Concerning the Admin. Dispute Resolution Act
Federal News Serv., Dec. 13, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File (dis-
cussing how DOJ is not opposed to removing the opt-out provision); see also 142 CONG.
REC. H5787 (daily ed. June 4, 1996) (discussing how a DOJ official testified in favor of
repealing the override).
23. To ensure that runaway arbitrators do not "break the bank," the ADRA requires
that the arbitration agreement must also specify the limits of the award. See 5 U.S.C.S. §
575(a)(2) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997). Thus, the arbitrator's authority is appropriately cor-
ralled.
24. For example, the Forest Service might settle a case brought by an environmental
group about the management of a particular forest. The settlement agreement might call
for certain actions to be taken over the course of five years; the agreement might also
provide that any disagreements over its implementation would be submitted to arbitration.
Through arbitration, the issues could be quickly resolved by a person with first-hand, on-
the-ground knowledge of what is happening. Arbitration can also be used, as is typical in
the private sector, to resolve construction disputes as they arise.
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to strike a delicate balance between the openness that ensures the
integrity of agreements and the level of confidentiality that is
necessary if they are to be reached.' To this end, Congress re-
solved the potential tug between the ADRA, which prohibited
disclosure by a neutral of confidential information,26 and the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),27 which could require its
revelation if the neutral were a government official. Congress
determined that a communication between a neutral and a party
that is confidential under the ADRA is also exempt from
FOIA.' This ambiguity had inhibited the use of government neu-
trals in dispute resolution.29
Some agencies expressed reluctance to use an explicit form of
mediation to resolve multiparty issues, fearing that those assem-
bled to develop an agreement might be regarded as an advisory
committee and hence the whole process would be required to be
conducted under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). 0
The Clinton administration took a hard line on establishing new
advisory committees, and even if they could be approved, it some-
25. See Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320, § 3,
110 Stat. 3870, 3870 (1996).
26. See Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-552, § 584,
104 Stat. 2736, 2740-41 (1990).
27. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
28. See 5 U.S.C. § 5740) (1994). It should be noted that this explicit protection does
not extend to communications among the parties. Discussion among the parties, however,
is closely akin to settlement negotiations without a mediator. Because there is no particu-
lar reason why those discussions should be accorded any different treatment from that
provided to unassisted settlement negotiations, they are treated the same as other settle-
ments. The conference committee made clear that a communication would be regarded as
being between two parties in a situation where a party gives a document to a neutral
who in turn provides it to another party. Since the neutral acts only as a conduit, Con-
gress felt this type of communication should not be covered by the exception. See 142
CONG. REC. 111,110 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (Joint Explanatory Statement of the Com-
mittee of Conference). The ADRA further provides that documents that are available to
all the parties are not covered by its confidentiality provisions. See 5 U.S.C. § 574(b)(7)
(1994). But, to facilitate the administrative use of early neutral evaluation and other simi-
lar settlement techniques when a neutral furnishes all of the parties with a proposal, the
Act also protects instances where the neutral generates a document that is provided to
all the parties. See 5 U.S.C.S. § 574(b)(7) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997); see also 142 CONG.
REc. H11,448 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1996) (statement of Rep. Reed) (discussing exemptions
from FOIA provided for under the statute).
29. There is a fairly broad use of government personnel, known as the "Shared
Neutrals Program," to help resolve internal EEO disputes. See 136 CONG. REc H12,968
(daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) ("An agency may use the services of one or more employees of
other agencies to serve as neutrals in regulatory proceedings.")
30. Pub. L. No. 92-463, § 1, 86 Stat. 770 (1972), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. (1994).
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times took six months or more for the paper to wind its way to
approval and establishment of the committee.3' As a result, agen-
cies were understandably nervous about doing anything which
might ensnare them in that bureaucratic nightmare. So agencies
simply avoided the bureaucracy by going underground, by not
using a proven technique to resolve contentious issues, or by sim-
ply not trying to reach consensus at all. Congress tried to address
this situation in two ways. First, it directed the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB) to "take appropriate action to expedite
the establishment of ... committees established to resolve disputes
under the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act."32 Second,
Congress directed OMB to study the potential for eliminating "any
redundant administrative requirements related to filing a commit-
tee charter... and providing public notice" of the intent to form
negotiated rulemaking committees.33 The reason Congress gave for
not making a similar directive with respect to committees estab-
lished under the ADRA is that FACA simply does not apply to
them. 4
Although I have not done any systematic survey or account-
ing, general observation and the Washington scuttlebutt suggests
that the use of consensual processes to resolve adjudicatory dis-
putes is indeed solidly in its adolescence;35 there is currently more
talk about using ADR than actual widespread use. But ADR
processes are now accepted means for addressing these issues: they
31. For a description of one agency's travail, see 142 CONG. REc. S6159 (daily ed.
June 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Johnston).
32. Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320, § 11(e),
110 Stat. 3870, 3874 (1996).
33. Id. The theory is that the formal notice of intent that is to be published in the
Federal Register would serve as the committee charter so that one document could serve
both purposes.
34. "It is the understanding of the Managers that the Federal Advisory Committee
Act (FACA) applies to proceedings under the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, but does not
apply to proceedings under the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act." 142 CONo. REC.
H11,110 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of
Conference).
35. The DOJ has established an Office of Dispute Resolution. The duties of the
office include clarifying the use and applicability of ADR. Because DOJ had always been
seen as somewhat reluctant to embrace ADR, its action in establishing this office and its
subsequent activities may send an important signal to other parts of the DOJ and other
administrative agencies. Indeed, the Attorney General encouraged the increased use of
ADR in a speech to the American Bar Association at its mid-year meeting, in January
1997, in San Antonio, and in a speech to the Society for Professionals in Dispute Res-
olution in Los Angeles in October 1996.
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are not alien; they are not regarded as somehow in derogation of
"real" procedure; they are not viewed (at least as much as they
once were) as "giving away the store;" and litigants seem to un-
derstand and accept them with increasing frequency. Thus, it looks
like this adolescent has a promising future.
The ADRA for the first time also authorizes agencies to use
"ombuds" as a form of dispute resolution. 36  In addition, the
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996
(SBREFA) also requires agencies to establish ombudsmen to help
resolve regulatory matters. 7 Ombudsmen have been widely used
in Europe for decades and their use in the United States has been
considered on multiple occasions, 38 it appears that the concept
may finally be taking root in the United States. Indeed, many of
the horror stories about regulation run amok that were raised in
the floor debates on the comprehensive regulatory reform legisla-
tion during the last term of Congress were not in fact problems
with either a statute or implementing rule but'rather were difficul-
ties stemming from their enforcement in the field-precisely the
type of issue that might best be addressed by an ombudsman. Al-
though in incubation for a generation, this approach to regulatory
36. See Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320, § 2,
110 Stat. 3870, 3870 (1996). There is some confusion over the term "ombudsman" or, the
gender neutral version that Congress employed, "ombuds." The classical use of the term
means an independent government official who receives complaints against government
agencies, who investigates the situation, and if merited, makes recommendations to rem-
edy the complaints. In this way, an ombudsman might be available to resolve conflicts or
other matters between a private citizen and the agency. In some instances, however, the
term has come to refer to someone who helps resolve issues, usually pertaining to em-
ployment in an agency; these are sometimes known as "internal ombudsmen."
37. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 657 (West Supp. 1997).
38. See, eg., Administrative Conference of the U.S., Recommendation No. 90-2, The
Ombudsman in Federal Agencies, 1 C.F.R. § 305-90-2 (1993); WALTER GELLHORN,
WHEN AMERiCANS COMPLAwN: GOVERNMENTAL GRiEvANcE PROCEDURES 57 (1966)
(discussing the workload of Congressmen); WALTER GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTH-
ERS: Citizens' Protectors in Nine Countries 1-5, 438-39 (1966) (describing the use of om-
budsmen in seven European countries); SAM ZAGORIA, THE OMBUDSMAN: How GOOD
GOVERNMENTS HANDLE CrrzENs' GRmEVANCES 68 (1988) (noting interest in ombudsmen
expressed by American professional organizations and describing grants made by the
federal Office of Economic Opportunity so that states and cities may study the possibility
of establishing an ombudsman's office); David R. Anderson & Diane M. Stockton, Om-
budsmen in Federal Agencies: The Theory and Practice, 112-122 (1990) (report for
ACUS) (describing the adoption of ombudsmen programs in Scandinavia and summarizing
the history of American interest in ombudsmen).
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issues is clearly in its infancy and developments surrounding the
regulatory use of ombudsmen merit careful attention.
Much is happening with regard to the use of ADR in adjudi-
cation. On the other side of the dichotomy, even more develop-
ments are taking place.
IMl. THE USE OF CONSENSUS IN POLICYMAKING
A wide array of techniques has arisen in the past 15 years by
which agencies consult with or otherwise involve the public in
making policy-related decisions. 9 Appendix A sets out those used
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The first column
is comprised of techniques the agency uses to consult with mem-
bers of the private sector to enhance the parties' understanding of
the situation. In these processes, at least one side will be providing
information to the other, and often there will be a structured
exchange of views. The participants are not expected to reach any
agreement and, indeed, none is achieved. Such discourses are
referred to generically as "information exchanges." The second
column reflects a more ambitious enterprise in which the agency
discusses an issue or set of issues with the expectation that the
participants will reach a general agreement on recommendations to
the agency. But-and this is critically important-it is clear that no
one is "bound" by the decision and that the agency will flesh out
any resulting advice. They are, in short, recommendations. These
techniques are often referred to as "policy dialogues" or simply as
"advisory committees." In the final column are consensus deci-
sions: The parties reach a specific agreement to which each party,
including the agency, is expected to adhere.
39. Because of their more informal procedure, states often used direct negotiations
and other forms of consultation earlier and more frequently than federal agencies. They
lagged, however, on the use of structured forms of ADR. States now appear to be using
such techniques in a variety of settings, including negotiated rulemaking and conferences
to develop legislation. See, e.g., CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
TEXAS NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING DESKBOOK (1996); WASHINGTON STATE OFFICE OF
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, A GUIDE TO PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN RULE MAKING
(1995). Vermont has used a form of negotiated rulemaking for tackling some of its most
difficult environmental issues, such as solid waste disposal and noise pollution. The South
Coast Association of Governments (SCAG) in California is about to embark on a reg
neg to "develop a process in which air quality emissions credit may be given for non-
regulatory or voluntary measures." Letter from Helene V. Smookler, ADR Coordinator,
SCAG, to Philip J. Harter (Apr. 1997) (on file with author).
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EPA has touted its variety of new forms of public involve-
ment. Its Common Sense Initiative (CSI) is an industrial sector-by-
sector endeavor among various stakeholders to find ways to devel-
op cleaner, cheaper, and smarter approaches to environmental
management than the medium-by-medium approach of the existing
environmental statutes.4 EPA describes its regulatory reinvention
initiative, Project XL, as "offer[ing] potential project sponsors and
co-sponsors the opportunity to develop and implement alternative
strategies that produce superior environmental performance, re-
place specific regulatory requirements, and promote greater ac-
countability to stakeholders;"'" throughout there is an emphasis,
but without particular detail, on stakeholder involvement in the
process. In addition, EPA has made many public statements about
its use of consensus in such areas as "Brownfields." 42
This general explosion of applications alone indicates a search
for new forms of participation in the regulatory process. The mere
existence of this range of approaches indicates a coming of age of
the quest to involve the public in regulatory decisions. Perhaps this
signifies a robust maturity. But, perhaps, in keeping with our met-
aphor, our adolescent merely underwent a growth spurt and is
now at an awkward stage. To decide whether this profusion of
processes is good, bad, or ugly requires a further analysis.
The most well developed of these techniques, other than the
public hearings and meetings that are adjuncts of the APA itself,
40. For a list of sources discussing the EPA's Common Sense Initiative, see THE
SCIENTMIC CONSULTING GROUP, INC., REVIEW OF THE COMMON SENSE INrTIATIVE app.
A (1997) [hereinafter CSI REVIEW].
41. Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot projects, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,872, 19,877 (1997);
see also Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282, 27,282-83
(1995) (earlier version of same).
42. These are industrialized areas that do not meet current EPA standards, but
nonetheless are marketable for development or for other economic use. In such situations
it is important to consider the best method for developing the site given its non-comply-
ing status. The question, therefore, is whether there are ways to develop the site without
full compliance with specific numerical requirements while still providing the requisite
level of protection and making it feasible, perhaps even attractive, to put the parcel to
use instead of leaving it abandoned. The neighbors, lending institutions, business interests,
environmental interests, and the environmental regulatory agencies each have a stake in
those decisions. See, eg., Announcement of Application Deadline for the Competition for
the 1997 National Brownfields Assessment Demonstration Pilots, 61 Fed. Reg. 56,953,
56,953 (1996); Carol Browner, Brownfields Agenda: Solving An Urban Pollution Problem,
WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 1996, at A14 (discussing President Clinton's Brownfields Action
Agenda and advocating the passage of new legislation -to encourage the cleaning of aban-
doned and contaminated land).
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is negotiated rulemaking (reg neg).' Fifteen years ago, when the
theory of negotiated rulemaking was just emerging, I predicted a
number of major benefits from the practice.' Among them was
the fact that the parties would be able to participate directly and
immediately in the decision, thereby providing a legitimacy that is
missing from hybrid rulemaking. In addition, the costs of develop-
ing the rule may be lower since the parties would not have to en-
gage in as much adversarial research and positioning. The parties
could focus on the issues that actually separate them and on the
issues of importance to them. "Rulemaking by negotiation can
ieduce the time and cost of developing regulations by emphasizing
practical and empirical concerns rather than theoretical predic-
tions."'45 The parties have the experience and ability to focus on
the details necessary to make a rule work day-to-day in the field.
Interestingly, the lack of judicial review was not advocated as a
prime benefit. It would be a likely ancillary benefit of the parties'
mutual acceptance of the rule and its ensuing legitimacy, but was
not an end in itself.
Such were the predictions before any reg negs were actually
undertaken. Formal evaluations are extraordinarily expensive and
face the difficulties inherent in making counter-factual predictions
(i.e., what would have happened if some other process were used
to develop the rule), or finding a suitably analogous rule with
which to compare a given proceeding.' As a result, few formal
evaluations have been conducted, so that it is difficult to deter-
43. Perhaps illogically, negotiated rulemaking goes by the shortened name of "reg
neg." The reason for the apparent reversal of terms is that initially the term used to
describe the process of negotiated rulemaking was "regulatory negotiation," but eventually
"negotiated rulemaking" became the more widely accepted term. See, eg., Regulatory
Negotiation: Joint Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Small Bus. and the
Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov't Management of the Senate Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 96th Cong. 138 (1980) (statements of Jeffrey H. Joseph, M. Kendall Fleeharty,
and Mark Schultz, U.S. Chamber of Commerce) (referring to regulatory negotiation com-
missions as "reg neg" commissions).
44. See Harter, supra note 4, at 28-31.
45. Id. at 30.
46. It is always difficult to determine what would have been done if what actually
was done had not happened. For example, if an individual purchases a new car, it is
virtually impossible for him to determine, three years after the fact, exactly what he
would have done with that money had he not bought the car, or whether he would have
been worse off financially had he used the money differently. The same is true when a
reg neg is used, for it is likewise *virtually impossible to determine if less expensive or
more effective means could have been employed to resolve the problem.
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mine in a rigorous way the extent to which the theory has been
borne out.
One major evaluation has been undertaken to compare nego-
tiated rules at the EPA with those developed by the traditional
notice-and-comment process. The study is currently being conduct-
ed for the EPA by Cornelius M. Kerwin, Dean of the School of
Public Affairs at American University and Professor Laura I.
Langbein. They have released a draft report of their analysis of
the reg neg portion of their study.47 Their initial conclusions in-
elude:
Based on the data presented above, negotiated rulemaking is
successful on several critical dimensions. It is widely perceived by
participants as an effective means for developing regulations on
virtually all important qualitative dimensions. The criteria estab-
lished in literature and law for the selection of candidates for reg
neg appear to be relevant in the selection process used by EPA,
although their importance appears to vary from case to case and
the discretion exercised by key Agency officials in the use of
techniques is obviously considerable. The opportunity to partici-
pate in the process appears to be extended broadly, albeit not
universally, and EPA or the facilitator it secured were frequently
identified as an initiator of participation.
The process of negotiation itself emerges as a very powerful
vehicle for learning what the participants in the process value
highly, and there are many types of information that is ex-
changed. The interviews suggest further that what is learned has
long-term value and is not confined to a particular
rulemaking.... The negotiation process employs a number of
devices to subdivide issues, such as working groups and caucuses,
that were viewed as effective by a substantial number of respon-
dents. And the use of non-committee observers serves as a de-
vice to expand participation without inflating the negotiating
groups past workable limits. Facilitators were generally viewed as
competent, unbiased and providing a number of services that
promoted consensus.
47. See generally CORNELIUS KERWIN & LAURA LANGBEIN, AN EVALUATION OF
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING AT THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECrION AGENCY: PHASE I
(1995) (report prepared for ACUS) [hereinafter KERWiN & LANGBEIN]. The report was
originally conducted for the EPA and ACUS, until funding for the latter was withdrawn.
See supra note 7.
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Most participants believe their participation had a substantial
effect on the agreement that was produced and report that the
opportunity to have an impact on the outcome was one of the
aspects of the process they considered most valuable.O
Moreover, a careful review of the experience with negotiated
rulemakings indicates that those predictions have, indeed, been re-
alized in diverse settings.49 Negotiated rulemakings have been
used by agencies to develop rules they knew would be controver-
sial but which were required by statute to be issued in a very
short period and for rules for which the customary notice-and-
comment process simply had not worked. EPA's Clean Fuels reg
neg developed the basis for reformulated gasoline and its sur-
rounding regulatory requirements in an astonishingly short period
given the magnitude of the task and the potential costs that the
resulting rule would likely impose.5' So, too, the Coast Guard
turned to reg neg when it became clear that the controversies
surrounding its vessel response plans meant that the rule would
probably not be issued in time to meet a critically important statu-
tory deadline that had enormous financial implications if the date
were missed. The committee, an international set of representa-
tives, was able to craft a notice of proposed rulemaking5' that
was published just seven months after the notice of intent to form
the committee appeared;52 the rule went into effect in another
seven months.53 In some instances, the reg neg committees have
48. Id. at 34.
49. Appendix B uses the list of negotiated rulemakings prepared by Professor
Coglianese but adds comments that explain particular aspects of some of them. See Cary
Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking,
46 DuKE L.J. 1255, 1281 tbl.3 (1997). Those comments illustrate what follows in the text.
50. See Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, 59 Fed. Reg. 7716 (1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80 (1996)).
Professor Coglianese correctly points out that the rule was ultimately changed and then
subjected to judicial review. See Coglianese, supra note 49, at 1290-92. Even though the
committee reached an agreement across the board, no rulemaking is immune from presi-
dential politics, and EPA changed the rule at the direction of the White House late in
an election year when pressured by a particular interest. The product of the reg neg still
provides the main basis for the rule that has had a significantly beneficial effect on air
pollution in our major cities.
51. See Vessel Response Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. 27,514 (1992) (proposed June 19, 1992).
52. See Vessel Response Plans and Carriage and Inspection of Discharge-Removal
Equipment, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,202 (1991) (notice of intent to form a negotiated rulemaking
committee published Nov. 18, 1991).
53. See Vessel Response Plans, 58 Fed. Reg. 7376 (1993) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt.
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been able to develop rules in a relatively expeditious time when
the issues have been languishing on the agency's dockets for
years-precisely because the agency has not been able to resolve
the underlying controversies. 4 And, in one of the few instances
in which a negotiated rule was closely analogous to a rule devel-
oped by traditional means, the negotiated rulemaking took only
half as long to draft the rule and cost only half as much."
The rules that emerge through reg neg reflect a shop-floor
insight and expertise. Hence, they can develop considerable inno-
vation and take account of issues that would likely escape the
attention of an agency in a traditional rulemaking. EPA's equip-
ment leak standard is such an example. 6 So is the steel erection
standard: 7 the committee identified a vast number of issues that
would greatly improve safety beyond the relatively narrow set of
issues initially foreseen by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA). 8
Interestingly, there is some indication that rules that emerge
from reg negs are more stringent than those the agency would
155 (1996)). That interim final rule was later incorporated into a broader set of rules,
but that does not diminish the fact that the committee produced a rule that went into
effect as scheduled.
54. For example, when OSHA's steel erection negotiated rulemaking advisory com-
mittee (SENRAC) was able to craft a standard governing the construction of steel struc-
tures-by far the greatest safety risk OSHA regulates-in about 18 months even though
the issue had been on OSHA's docket for two decades! (Requests for clarification of the
existing Subpart R were submitted in 1974; OSHA began drafting a proposed rule for
Subpart R in 1984 and submitted it to its standing advisory committee for comment).
During that period, OSHA had attempted, unsuccessfully, to issue a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking.
55. Telephone Interview with James M. Estep, Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Dep't of
Labor (May 1997) (discussing OSHA's Methylenedianiline (MDA) and 1, 3-Butadiene
standards).
56. Chemical plants, like houses, can develop drippy faucets; it is desirable to keep
the leaks to a minimum, especially when they release toxic chemicals. This standard
imposed requirements to test and fix valves to reduce the emission of toxic chemicals. It
is true, as Professor Coglianese points out, that nearly three years elapsed before the
consensus was published as a final rule. That is because it was a part of EPA's Hazard-
ous Organic NESHAP (National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants) under
section 112 of the Clean Air Act of 1990, and the equipment leak portion had to await
completion of the other parts before it could become final. Meanwhile, however, there
was testimony that many firms were complying with the standard long before required to
do so.
57. See 29 C.F.R. § 1926.105 (1997).
58. See 62 Fed. Reg. 21,966-67 (1997) (discussing how negotiated rulemaking greatly
improved the steel erection standard rulemaking process).
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have been able to issue on its own; nevertheless, these rules are
cheaper to implement precisely because the committee can focus
on ways to get the greatest return. As for judicial review, there
has never been a judicial challenge to a negotiated rule where the
agency issued the rule as negotiated and the parties agreed not to
challenge it.59
Unlike other forms of administrative procedure, reg negs and
other means of consensus building have few fixed rules. Their
hallmark is their flexibility: they are highly adaptive and can be
modified to take account of changing circumstances. While pliable,
they are not formless. The benefits of negotiated rulemaking have
resulted from a careful attention to detail and a few fundamental
precepts. Since both the integrity of the process and its success
turn on their observance, it is worth emphasizing them here.
A. Convening
The Negotiated Rulemaking Act contemplates that a relatively
comprehensive inquiry will precede a decision to empanel a com-
mittee.' The purpose of this inquiry is to identify: the interests
that would be affected by the rule; the issues that need to be
resolved in the rulemaking; the information that is needed to re-
solve those issues; and to determine whether the conditions de-
scribed in the Act that have been developed to predict whether or
not the committee will reach closure have been met. This is a
critically important phase of every negotiated rulemaking.
Anyone convening the negotiating committee needs to recog-
nize that the committee will be engaged in a very democratic
process. In the normal democratic process, each person is repre-
sented by a representative elected from a regional area. This rep-
59. The only case that actually discusses the judicial review of a negotiated rule is
USA Group Loan Services, Inc. v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708, 714-15 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing
student loan servicers' complaint that the Department of Education violated the process
by negotiating in bad faith). Although it is not entirely clear from the court's opinion, it
appears that either the committee did not reach agreement or the agency's rule is not
fully consistent with an agreement if one existed. For a criticism of Judge Posner's lack
of understanding of negotiated rulemaking, see Philip J. Harter, First Judicial Review of
Reg Neg A Disappointment, 22 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Fall 1996, at 1, 1, 12. Another
case involving the judicial review of a set of negotiated rules is Career College Ass'n v.
Riley; the court, however, only mentions that fact in passing, and from its discussion, it
surely appears that the rules that emerged were not the product of consensus. See 74
F.3d 1265, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
60. See 5 U.S.C. § 563(a) (1994).
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resentation has nothing to do with interests or common views on
an issue but is instead based solely on geography.6 Each repre-
sentative must distill competing views within the geographic area,
and cannot really be expected to represent a particular interest ful-
ly in a matter. The underlying purpose is to ensure that each
person who is interested in the matter can somehow be represent-
ed. The committee needs what mathematicians refer to as a "cov-
ering space"-a collection of sets such that each member of the
space being covered belongs to at least one of the sets. One way
of doing that would be to use interest as the assigning variable:
each affected party is entitled to be represented in the delibera-
tions and decision by means of its interest in the outcome. The
organizing principle, therefore, is the differentiation of interests,
not of areas. The outcome, however, is the same: everyone is
represented.
As law professors love to point out, it is impossible to achieve
this breadth of representation in practice; not every narrowly de-
fined, specific interest is in fact represented at the table.62 But, a
proper convening does ensure that there are enough diverse gener-
al interests effectively represented at the table so that the major
issues will be fully and fairly raised, discussed, and negotiated.
Moreover, a convening is a form of outreach in which the agency
actively seeks diverse representatives to take part in the develop-
ment of the rule from its infancy. As a result, a far greater range
of interests actually participates in the rule than in customary
notice-and-comment rulemaking where the agency passively re-
ceives comments.6" For example, in one recent convening the
agency was asked to list the interests that would need to partici-
61. As we have seen from our political history, districts can, of course, be doctored
to ensure that they represent some sort of value shared by a majority, such as political
viewpoint or racial preferences.
62. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at
Regulatory Negotiation, 43 DUKE L.L 1206, 1210 (1994) (stating that while reg neg partic-
ipants must be similarly well-organized, knowledgeable, and skillful, there should not be
too many distinct groups).
63. In continuing the mathematical analogies, the representatives need to "span the
space," so that any other interests can be made up of combinations of those representa-
tives. That would be the case, for example, if the diversity of interests were such that
one could be confident that all the major issues would be raised by someone on the
committee.
64. Why is it that those same law professors who raise convening concerns with
respect to negotiated rulemaking do not seem bothered by the lack of diverse representa-
tion among the comments in traditional rulemaking?
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pate in a negotiated rulemaking, and after internal consultation it
produced a dozen. By the time the convening was completed, the
list had doubled; many more interests were identified that could
provide insight into the issues under discussion.'
In addition to selecting the parties, the convening also defines
the issues that need to get resolved. The discussions with those
who have a direct, firsthand insight into what is happening of-
ten-indeed almost always-play a crucial role in defining the
issues that need to be resolved. For example, in EPA's equipment
leaks reg neg, the agency initially proposed to negotiate the con-
version factors that are used to translate the volume of chemicals
being processed into estimates of air emissions. The convening re-
vealed that the parties thought it was more important to negotiate
the actual control of the plants, however, so that is what was done
(the conversion factors remained unchanged).
The convening also serves an important educational value. As
the convener discusses the process with the potential participants,
he also conveys how convenings typically work, what is expected
of participants, how long it will take, the level of commitment that
will be required, how the meetings will function, and so on. This
can allay considerable anxiety on the part of those who have not
played the game before, especially those who are not familiar with
the policy process. The parties are therefore more ready to settle
down and begin work than if those questions remained unan-
swered. The parties can also raise any special concerns that may
need to be addressed if the negotiations are to run smoothly.66
65. In addition, the convening may reveal that an interest consists of many shades of
a general interest, each varying in one regard or another. In such a case, the convener
may recommend that the interest occupy a certain number of chairs at the table and that
the members of the interest select their own representatives to reflect that diversity. In
one negotiation, for example, an interest was assigned three seats to reflect the three
dimensions along which the members of the group differed. Also, the convening will
highlight the issues that need to be resolved, and some of the people contacted in the
convening will likely be more interested in some of those issues than others. The conven-
er may then recommend that those individuals participate on work groups that will make
recommendations to the full committee; the committee itself usually controls who the
members of the workgroups are, but by and large they are open to those who are inter-
ested and who possess the requisite technical background. Furthermore, at many of the
negotiations, anyone who wishes to speak may do so as long as it does not get out of
hand (which occurs extremely rarely). As a result, everyone who is interested in partici-
pating generally can participate. In the end, literally hundreds of people may participate
directly in the development of a negotiated rule or other major decision.
66. For example, in one reg neg, a party was concerned that difficult relations it had
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The convening also helps establish a common view as to the issues
that will be examined in the process. To an extent, this is the
fable of the blind men and the elephant: each has a different view
as to the nature of the beast. For example, in one negotiation the
facilitator asked each party to describe its view of the issue. The
suggestion to do so was immediately challenged by one of the
senior members of the committee as being unnecessary since ev-
eryone present understood the issue. The facilitator persevered and
after each member had his say, the objector quipped, "See I was
right, everyone did understand the issue-only they each saw dif-
ferent issues. '
Finally, to ensure that no one is overlooked, and so no one
feels left out, the Act provides that the agency should publish a
"Notice of Intent" (NOI) in the Federal Register as well as in
more mainstream publications such as trade or other specialized
journals, where "mere mortals" are likely to encounter the not-
ices.' The notice seeks public comment on a description of the
tentative membership 69 and the issues to be negotiated. 7' A criti-
cal aspect of the NOI is that it describes the means by which
anyone who feels they would not otherwise be represented by the
tentatively identified members can apply for membership on the
had in another area might spill over into the negotiations and it needed assurance that
that would not happen before it was willing to participate. In another, the internal struc-
ture of a caucus had to be carefully thought through before the process would work.
67. Gerald Cormick, a pioneer in the use of mediation to resolve environmental
issues, uses a wonderful metaphor to describe the educational value of convening. He
asks rhetorically about what would happen if you were to convene a group to negotiate
the rules of football. The Americans would contemplate a game with 11 players using an
oblong ball. The Canadians would come prepared to talk about 12 players. The rest of
the world would talk about a game that prohibits the use of hands and uses a round
ball. The convening would at least highlight the differences so they could be addressed in
the negotiations, or the parties could determine what the real issues are given that diver-
sity of perception. See Gerald W. Cormick, Strategic Issues in Structuring Multi-Party
Public Policy Negotiations, 5 NEGOTIATION J. 125, 126 (1989); see also supra notes 51-52
and accompanying text (discussing the reaching of consensus in the Coast Guard Vessel
Response Plan reg neg).
68. See 5 U.S.C. § 564(a) (1994).
69. The Negotiated Rulemaking Act contemplates that the specific individuals who
are "proposed to represent [the interests which are likely to be significantly affected by
the rule]" and "the person or persons proposed to represent the agency" will be named
in the notice. Id. Not infrequently, however, the notice only includes a description of the
interests, and does not include a list of who will represent the various interests. The
notices should, and usually do, describe who will represent the agency because that can
have an important bearing on the nature of the process.
70. See id.
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committee.7' Frequently, individuals apply for membership based
on the notice and proceed to participate fully. Thus, the process is
designed to make as full an effort as is practically feasible to iden-
tify those who would be affected by a rule and to ensure that they
are represented at the table.72
B. Used Only Where Appropriate
Negotiated rulemaking is not an end in itself, but rather is a
tool for making regulatory decisions. Like other tools, it has its
time and place and, like other tools, can impose costs and hard-
ships if misused. Thus, negotiated rulemaking should only be em-
ployed if its criteria are met,73 or if the agency has some overrid-
ing reason to believe that the negotiations will be productive and
not harmful.
C. Process Design
Like adolescents, every negotiated rulemaking committee is
unique. These differences must be addressed through a careful
crafting of the negotiated rulemaking process. During the design
process, certain questions must be addressed, including: What
information will form the basis for the negotiation? Where will the
information come from? How will the specific facts of the rule or
other decision be developed? What schedule should be followed?
Should workgroups be formed, and if so, what should they ad-
dress? Will the workgroups be limited to committee members or
their designees, or will they include people not on the committee?
Who appoints the outside participants? In short, many practical
71. See id. at § 564(a)(8).
72. Ideally, one would want to be able to walk up to any member of the public and
ask what their interest is in the rule, and then point to the representative of that interest
on the committee.
73. Congress has, on a number of occasions, required agencies to use a form of ne-
gotiated rulemaking to develop specific rules. The'provisions were likely inserted at the
request of disgruntled constituents who felt the agencies simply did not listen to them
sufficiently, and reg neg was a means of forcing the agencies to address their interests. A
statutorily required reg neg does not afford the opportunity to determine whether the cri-
teria that predict success are met in individual cases, and an important one of those
criteria is that the agency agrees to rely on the process, a reliance which cannot be coer-
ced. With regard to specific criteria, see generally 5 U.S.C. § 564. Perhaps that helps
explain why the two recent cases each stemmed from statutorily required reg negs. For
discussion of these cases, see supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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issues need to be resolved before the negotiations start if they are
to be successful.74
D. Participate Openly and in Good Faith
It is critical for the agency to participate in the rough and
tumble of the negotiations very much like any other participant. If
the agency approaches the negotiations as if it has all the answers
and only seeks ratification, the negotiation will end with no agree-
ment (since if solutions were so easy, there would not be any need
to engage in a negotiated rulemaking75), and anger on the part of
the participants (since they would reasonably feel that they had
wasted their time). At the other extreme, if the agency sits back
and takes no position, the parties are not likely to reach any
agreement-they will talk and talk, but not converge. The reason
is that if the negotiations do not reach closure, the agency will
issue the rule on its own; the agency's rule will then define the
parties' "Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement"
(BATNA).76 The parties will keep talking in an effort to learn
more about what the agency wants or will do on its own. Only
then can the parties determine their BATNA, the standard by
which they will judge whether a proposal is in their best interest.
The agency's staff plays an essential role during a negotiated
rulemaking by taking the lead in crafting the issues and analyzing
the data. Indeed, a reg neg is a way for the staff to leverage its
knowledge: They can learn an enormous amount by engaging in
the sometimes intense give-and-take of the negotiations and can
gain practical insights from the other participants that would other-
wise be virtually impossible to develop on their own. In fact, a
number of agency officials who have participated in negotiated
rulemakings have found the experience extremely rewarding pre-
cisely because of its "problem solving" nature and the ability to
generate innovative solutions.
74. See Cormick, supra note 67, at 126 (using a football metaphor to describe the
educational value of convening).
75. I recall two very different reg negs in which mid-level agency staff explained
their views as to what the ultimate rule would look like; when I asked why the agencies
wanted to go forward with the reg neg, I was told by senior officers of both that the
staff's views would simply not carry the day and would result in immediate paralysis of
the rulemaking effort-the political process would take over in one form or another.
76. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETrING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREE-
MENT WITHouT GIvING IN 104 (1981).
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E. Consensus
Consensus is defined by the Negotiated Rulemaking Act as
"unanimous concurrence among the interests represented on a
negotiated rulemaking committee ... unless such committee-(A)
agrees to define such term to mean a general but not unanimous
concurrence; or (B) agrees upon another specified definition." 77
Basically, this definition means that each interest has a veto over
the proposal, and that each interest must determine that the rule,
when viewed as a whole, is acceptable,7 8 at least as compared to
the alternatives.79 This forces the parties to deal with each oth-
er80 and to view the rule as a whole, instead of as a series of
separate, freestanding requirements.8 ' This plays an important
77. 5 U.S.C. § 562(2) (1994).
78. For example, a facilitator would like to avoid asking the parties for affirmative
assent until the very end of the negotiation. Rather, as the discussions move along, the
question would more likely be, "any problems" or "any dissent." Thus, the parties need
not display a positive embrace, only that they are willing to go along with the proposal
when considered as a whole and when considered in contrast to their BATNA.
79. EPA recently concluded an evaluation of the experience thus far with its Com-
mon Sense Initiative. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. A criticism of the CSI
process that runs throughout the evaluation reflects the importance of this definition of
consensus:
Participants in CSI perceive that consensus has been defined as unanimity, thus
providing each individual with a veto power. This has hampered progress and
many suggested that consensus be redefined to require less than complete
agreement by all participants. This would allow an idea to move forward, even
if some participants did not favor it, but could "live with it."
CSI REVIEW, supra note 40, at iii. This CSI definition of consensus requires every indi-
vidual participant to express affirmative support for the agreement. The definition in the
Negotiated Rulemaking Act, however, contemplates that each interest must concur, recog-
nizing that individuals within each interest may have some reservations, but that the
interest, when considered as a whole, supports the decision. In addition, the overall affir-
mation is to the decision as a whole, not the individual pieces, so that the measure, all
things considered, is whether each interest can "live with" the decision. Id. CSI clearly
would have benefited by learning from the reg neg experience.
80. If the parties voted, those in the majority would have no reason to hear out
those in the minority on an issue. The curt answer to someone's proposal would be a
simple, "Let's vote." If, however, consensus must be reached, the people in the majority
must grapple with the minority's issues of concern.
81. When consensus is reached on the entire rule or policy under deliberation, each
party needs to understand that they will not be thrilled with each and every provision.
Instead, each participant needs to focus on the elements of importance to its constituen-
cy. Deciding whether to concur in a negotiated rule is a bit like buying a house: a house
may have many nice features but there is always something about it that is not as nice
as some other house. You cannot, however, buy a house that has one feature from one
house and another feature from another house, and so on. You have to buy the whole
house, warts and all. So too with rules. The reason that this analogy holds true is that
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role in knitting the committee together into a cohesive group with
a common goal: developing an acceptable rule. Thus, tinkering
with the definition of consensus entails a very high risk of failure
and dramatically changes the functioning of the committee.
The dynamics of the process change markedly if either the
definition of consensus is modified to require less than unanimity
or, if no attempt is made to reach full closure, to require a com-
mitment to adhere to the agreement. During the discussions them-
selves, the parties are likely to espouse their positions-the policies
they have advocated publicly-as opposed to developing their
underlying interests or needs. This is because if the parties do not
control the outcome in the form of an agreement in which they
concur, they cannot afford to back off from their adversarial posi-
tions. Although the rancor may be reduced, especially after multi-
ple meetings, parties are likely to continue to maintain an ad-
versarial stance, attempting to influence the ultimate decision by
exaggerating the facts and policy concerns. Moreover, it is difficult
to develop sophisticated trade-offs. For example, if a party is will-
ing to accept something only on the condition that another condi-
tion is met (e.g., it could accept a low limit if phased in over a
period of time) and that party does not control whether the condi-
tion will in fact be fulfilled (e.g., whether the phasing will be per-
mitted), the party is not likely to agree to the initial result (e.g.
the low limit) or even to admit that it is possible. Further, partici-
pation by a party does not ensure that that party will accept the
final decision or not take action to stop it; thus, the agency and
others may have learned something, but it is wrong to assume that
simply because someone participated they will not take subsequent
action to change the outcome. And, indeed, the process may actu-
ally increase frustration if parties are asked their views and then
are ignored.
F. Early Implementation
Once the committee has reached a consensus, the agency
needs to act expeditiously to implement it. If any new issues arise
during its review, the agency should raise them with the committee
different parties value elements of each rule differently. Requiring parties to view the
rule as a whole, however, forces the parties to address the needs of each interest and
then to achieve a consensus.
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to gain its collective insight. If instead the agency second-guesses
the committee or takes a long time to review the materials, the
initial support can wane. This undoubtedly is a form of the "com-
pression" that Professor Coglianese mentions, but by that time
very little usually remains to be done.'
IV. SUPPORT FROM THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION
Perhaps because of negotiated rulemaking's early success83 in
addressing some complex, controversial rulemakings and perhaps
because the inclusive nature of consensual processes comports with
its political bent, the Clinton administration has voiced strong sup-
port for the use of reg neg and other consensual processes. Presi-
dent Clinton's Executive Order on White House oversight of
rulemaking encourages agencies to use consensual processes, espe-
cially negotiated rulemaking, for developing rules.'
The Vice President's National Performance Review (NPR)
noted:
The traditional model for rulemaking is that of agency experts
deciding the best way to regulate, offering the public an opportu-
nity to comment on the agency's proposed rule or to object to its
adoption, and then issuing binding rules telling regulated entities
what to do. Even if the agency experts choose wisely, the tradi-
tional model has very little buy-in from outside the agency, which
undermines the rule's effectiveness. This traditional process en-
courages adversarial, uncooperative behavior on the part of pri-
vate industry or others who might be affected by an agency's
decisions, which frequently leads to protracted litigation. Agencies
routinely find themselves under attack from various private par-
ties who are unhappy with the rule. This has been particularly
true in controversial areas such as environmental regulation or
the health and safety of workers.8
The NPR's recommendation for rectifying this problem is to "in-
crease the use of negotiated rulemaking."'86 It further recommends
82. See Coglianese, supra note 49, at 1285-86.
83. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
84. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(1994).
85. OFFICE OF THE VICE PREsiDENT, ACCOMPANYING REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
PERFORMANCE REvIEW: IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS 29 (1993) [hereinafter IM-
PROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS].
86. Id. at 32.
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that the President encourage agencies to use reg neg and urge
them to identify at least one candidate for the process.' It also
suggests that "[t]he administration should facilitate efforts to use
reg neg by identifying and removing any administrative barriers to
its use."8 And, indeed, the President issued a memorandum to
the heads of agencies directing that they use reg neg at least
onceg---probably on the theory of "try it, you'll like it."9
Sparked by this interest and high-level attention, a number of
agencies that had not previously used reg neg have now either
actually used it or are at various stages of starting the process.
NPR likewise recommended that the President encourage
agencies "to use alternative means of dispute resolution."'" A
year ago, the President issued an Executive Order on "Civil Jus-
tice Reform."92 Although primarily aimed at litigation in federal
courts, the Order has several important ramifications for adminis-
trative ADR. It provides:
Where the benefits of Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR")
may be derived, and after consultation with the agency referring
the matter, litigation counsel should suggest the use of an appro-
priate ADR technique to the parties.... It is appropriate to use
ADR techniques or processes to resolve claims of or against the
United States or its agencies, after litigation counsel determines
that the use of a particular technique is warranted in the context
of a particular claim or claims, and that such use will materially
contribute to the prompt, fair, and efficient resolution of the
claims.'
87. See id. at 32.
88. Id.
89. See Memorandum for Executive Departments and Selected Agencies [and the]
Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 58 Fed. Reg. 52,391
(1993).
90. The Administration was not entirely consistent in this regard, however, a fact
which did not escape the attention of the agencies. While it paid lip service to encourag-
ing agencies to use consensual processes, it simultaneously made it much more difficult
for agencies to obtain the requisite charters under the Federal Advisory Committee Act
that are necessary for reg negs and other consensual processes that culminate in a com-
mitment.
91. IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 85, at 3.





V. CURRENT PERFORMANCE-SO WHERE ARE WE Now?
With such high level support from the White House, and with
the EPA using consensus or public participation processes as an
integral part of virtually all of its major initiatives,4 it might logi-
cally be said that administrative ADR has never been hardier. The
adolescent would surely get an A, with honors to boot.
In one regard, that is certainly true. The landscape of rule-
making and other forms of policy development has been trans-
formed. It is now customary for agencies to invite direct public
participation or stakeholder involvement before taking regulatory
action. Indeed, the techniques described in Appendix A indicate
the rich variety of processes that have emerged and the full range
of circumstances in which they are employed. The use of these
processes has injected a significant degree of democracy into the
regulatory process that was previously lacking in more hierarchical
decisionmaking. This effect cannot not be overemphasized. On the
other hand, there is less good news in the use of consensus pro-
cesses to make specific decisions that are actually implemented.
There are some very bright spots, however. The Department
of Transportation and its various auxiliary agencies have widely
embraced negotiated rulemaking and have used it to develop a
variety of rules. Indeed, both the Federal Aviation Administration
and the Federal Railroad Administration have established standing
committees that consider a range of issues.
Alas, such is not the case generally. While there is much brav-
ado, there is less substance. For example, the EPA has not initiat-
ed a single negotiated rulemaking during this administration, presi-
dential directive notwithstanding. This appears symptomatic of the
current state of affairs. Briefly stated, two things seem to be hap-
pening: First, the decisions to implement consensus-type processes
are being made at lower levels in the agencies, and many career
agency officials seem to feel uncomfortable with processes that
lead to a commitment. Second, agencies are simply not paying
careful attention to the parts of the process that have made it so
successful.9 5
94. EPA initiatives making use of public participation include the Agency's Common
Sense Initiative, Project XL and "Brownfields." See supra note 41 and accompanying
text.
95. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. Like an adolescent, the agencies may
be sloughing off various procedures that were used previously in part because they do
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A. Convening
Too frequently, the crucial convening stage of a consensus
process has been either ignored or short-circuited. For example,
some agencies have simply invited anyone who wanted to attend
meetings at which the potential for conducting a reg neg or other
consensus process would be discussed. The agencies did not ex-
pend the effort to identify the parties or the issues. This is unfor-
tunate, as careful selection of interested parties and the issues both
ensures the broad-based participation necessary to legitimize the
process (and to ward off judicial review) and defines the issues.
For example, at least some of EPA's CSI initiatives were not
convened in the common understanding of the process,96 and
many felt that the composition of some of the committees may not
have been fully appropriate and that they languished before gain-
ing direction. Suitable convening could have remedied that.97 Fur-
ther, a proper convening also greatly expedites the process once it
starts.
In some instances, agencies have undertaken a brief convening
on their own in an effort to save time and/or money." While it
not understand why they are important and in part to experiment with new approaches.
Successful adolescents learn and build both on what went before and on their own exper-
imentation. Currently there is enough discussion and whispers of concern that the exami-
nation may soon take place.
96. Some on the EPA staff were actually hostile to the notion of convening, declar-
ing it "old fashioned."
97. The CSI evaluation has two interesting insights along these lines:
While the overall goals of CSI were articulated by the Administrator in initi-
ating the program, specific objectives and expectations for the program were
not. Instead of encouraging out-of-the-box thinking as hoped, this has led to de-
lays . . . as [participants] tried to figure out what EPA wanted or would accept
instead of inventing their own priorities and processes. While this has improved
as the subcommittees have set their own agendas, they still look to EPA for
more leadership.
CSI Review, supra note 40, at ii. A thorough convening develops a common understand-
ing before the parties come together. That way, the negotiation process can be productive
from the outset.
The evaluation also pointed out that:
additional preparatory work as new sectors are selected would be beneficial.
EPA should conduct some background research with potential participants to
learn about opportunities for and barriers to improved environmental perfor-
mance. This could also serve to identify potential participants and to ascertain
their levels of interest and commitment to a process like CSI. Those partici-
pants who would need technical assistance could begin to receive it early, per-
haps before the formal stakeholder group convened.
ILd. at iii.
98. In an effort to reduce the out-of-pocket costs of convening, some agencies have
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surely works for agencies to do their own convening (although it
usually works better to have someone from outside the agency do
it, precisely to develop a more candid response from those in the
private sector and to provide objective advice99), the convening
still needs to be complete and thorough. Thus, more attention
should be paid to the convening stage of all consensus process-
es.
100
More attention should also be paid to the actual process itself.
In too many instances the terms "consensus," "stakeholder involve-
ment," "public participation," or the like have been invoked as if
they all referred to the same process and outcome so that their
mere incantation meant that everyone's views were incorporated
into a decision and that everyone accepted the results. There has
been too little of the painstaking, lawyerly approach of carefully
designing a system. The processes developed over the years that
proved so successful were the result of an enormous amount of
debate, discussion, and scholarship, building on the experience of
similar or analogous programs. Each stage was carefully developed.
used experienced personnel from other agencies as the convener. This has appeared to
work quite well, especially when the convenor collaborates with the person who will
ultimately serve as the facilitator.
99. It is sometimes alleged that a convener from the private sector may have a con-
flict of interest since he would be inclined to recommend going forward with a reg neg
on the expectation that he would then serve as its facilitator; the bias, therefore, would
be to get more business. While there is undoubtedly at least some merit to the concern,
there are strong countervailing reasons to have the same person do both. First of all, the
neutral learns a great deal about the issues and the parties during convening that can
then be put to use during the actual negotiations; if another person serves as the facil-
itator, much of that knowledge either must be re-learned or, more likely, the newcomer
will simply have to do without some of that insight because the relationship between the
facilitator and the parties is different than that of a convener and a prospective party.
Second, if a negotiation is not in fact appropriate, so that it is unlikely the parties will
reach agreement or some harm may be done, and the convener and the facilitator are
the same person, everyone knows whom to blame: there is definite accountability. If they
are different, each can point to the other if the reg neg fails, thereby diluting account-
ability. Since no neutral can guarantee that the parties will converge to agreement, it is
not the case that some neutral--convener or facilitator-should always be held responsi-
ble if the committee fails to reach agreement. Rather, the accountability arises only
when the circumstances were such that the negotiations should not have moved forward
in the first place.
100. There is, for example, some controversy over the "convening" stages of the
EPA's Project XL program. See, e.g., Cindy Skrzycki, Critics See a Playground for Pollut-
ers in EPA's XL Plan, WASH. POST, Jan 24, 1997, at DI (discussing how the implemen-
tation of new regulatory approaches can make it difficult to convene an EPA project).
A rigorous attention to who sits at the table and what issues are on it would go a long
way toward deflecting some of this criticism.
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Very little of that has been done for the new initiatives, and the
deficiency shows."0'
B. Level of Decision
There has been a "top down" encouragement to use consen-
sus processes in this administration, including directives from the
President, Vice President, and agency heads. While this encourage-
ment was surely well intended, it has led some program managers
to use reg neg or other consensus processes simply for the sake of
doing so, or to fulfill a political requirement even if a consensus
process is an inappropriate tool. To be sure, the fit was certainly
good in some instances; in others, however, the agency's approach
to the process was less than enthusiastic.
While overall support from senior officials has been high, the
day-to-day implementation of reg negs and other forms of consen-
sus has devolved to lower levels within the agencies. Before, fairly
senior officers would make the decision to use a reg neg based on
their view of the surrounding political controversy, the need to
develop information that was mainly in the private sector, the
need to tap the insights and expertise of the private sector, and
various other motivations. Surely one of the animating features of
the decision was that the agency staff alone did not have sufficient
horsepower to write the final rule."° Now, however, it appears
101. As one reviewer-the mother of several small children-commented, in too many
instances the agency was indeed acting like an adolescent's strong desire to do it "By
myself!" Although the phrase itself is probably better befitting a two-year old, the point
is that the processes are used in new ways without carefully analyzing what worked and
why. Although such experimentation can help determine what does and what does not
work in various situations, and hence ultimately lead to better practice, it would be more
reassuring, and surely more efficient, if the experimentation were done knowingly.
For example, it is relatively striking that the CSI evaluation makes no mention
whatsoever of EPA's significant experience with negotiated rulemakings. See supra note
40 and accompanying text. Perhaps, however, it should not be so surprising that the
evaluation would not make mention of it, for the agency itself seemed to pay so little
heed to its own experience.
102. Lest there be any confusion here, the agency staff plays a critically important
role in raising the issues, focusing the discussion, working out the various options, and
generally being a leader. What this sentence means is simply that in many of the highly
controversial rules, it is important to garner the insights and participation of those af-
fected if the rule is to: 1) be developed in a timely fashion; 2) take account of all rele-
vant information; and 3) be implemented on time. Otherwise, the rule might be held up
in internal development and White House review, judicial review, or review at the agency
itself. Rulemaking is, after all, the political side of agency action, and as Louis Jaffee
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that fairly uniformly across the government, the decisions to imple-
ment these programs are being made on a program basis; a fair
amount of resistance to the use of a consensus process has devel-
oped at that level."
C. Consultation, not Consensus
A negotiated rulemaking forces the parties to bring an enor-
mous amount of practical information to the table and hence ex-
pands the data base on which to build a regulation. The practical
insight contributed by those with first-hand experience also allows
agency staff to focus resources on areas with the greatest potential
payback. While these may seem to be considerable benefits of the
process, a fair number of agency personnel feel it is inconsistent
with their prerogative to share the decision with others around thetable." 4
For example, the Steel Erection Negotiated Rulemaking Advi-
sory Committee (SENRAC) at OSHA developed a rule addressing
the erection of steel buildings and other structures. 5 When the
pointed out in his last major article, political controversy continues to swirl around an
agency's exercise of its rulemaking authority. See Louis L. Jaffee, The Illusion of the
Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1183, 1191 (1973).
103. For example, within the past six months, I am aware of at least three agencies
which were in various stages of considering using or completing reg negs that had been
convened in which staff opposed "sharing" decisions as inconsistent with the role of the
agency. In two of those, the agency had been unable to fulfill its task of developing suit-
able regulations,'and yet the notion of using reg neg was perceived as threatening to the
prerogative of the agency-never mind that it had never been exercised due to political
controversy and the lack of suitable information on which to base the regulations.
104. For example, in a recently issued set of recommendations, the Public Sector
Critical Issues Committee of the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution stated, in
bold:
Before a government agency or official decides to sponsor an agreement seek-
ing process, it should consider its objectives and the suitability of the issues and
circumstances for negotiation. In particular, before the sponsoring agency con-
venes a collaborative process, it is essential for the agency to determine inter-
nally its willingness to share control over the process and the resolution of the
issue.
PUBLIC SECTOR CRITICAL ISSUES COMM., SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE RESo-
LUTION, BEST PRACTICES FOR GOVERNMENT AGENCIES: GUIDELINES FOR USING COL-
LABORATIVE AGREEMENT-SEEKING PROCESSES 5 (report accompanying Recommendation
1) (Jan. 1997).
As an example of the contrary attitude, one branch chief endorsed a consensus ap-
proach by saying that the committee should make no mistake that she and she alone had
the authority to make the relevant decision, but that the decision would not be invali-
dated simply because the others agreed with her.
105. See Steel Erection, 62 Fed. Reg. 21,967 (1997) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
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rulemaking started, the primary, indeed virtually the only issue in
contention was how high an ironworker could climb before having
to be secured or otherwise protected from falls. It became clear as
the negotiations progressed that many other factors would contrib-
ute significantly to a safer work place.
Although the fall protection scheme in SENRAC's recommen-
dation is based on an earlier standard developed by OSHA itself,
and in many ways is more stringent than that standard for compa-
rable work, the standard has been opposed internally by OSHA
staff. This opposition has arisen despite the fact that OSHA had
representatives on the committee (one formally, the other as coun-
sel) through whom its staff could have voiced its concerns, and
despite the fact that senior officials and committee members who
strongly advocated safety concurred in the standard. The staff has
delayed adoption of the standard by 18 months, just as they did in
OSHA's previous reg neg on MDA. This is certainly not an exam-
ple of the staff's being frozen out of the decisionmaking process,
since it could have fully participated both in internal caucuses and
in the negotiating sessions.
Because of the staff's feeling that it must preserve its authori-
ty to ensure a "correct" decision on the issue,"° there has been
a reluctance to embrace consensual processes in which the out-
come is an agreement-a commitment on the part of private sec-
tor and agency alike to abide by the agreement. Just why that re-
sistance has grown in this administration is difficult to explain.0 7
Instead, there has been a broader endorsement of "consultative"
processes or "consensus recommendations" in which the committee
provides advice to the agency for its due consideration. As dis-
1926) (proposed Apr. 25, 1997) (describing the history of SENRAC and the development
of the rule).
106. In many of the instances in which reg neg would be an appropriate tool, the
notion of "control" is not so clear: Although the agency may clearly have the authority
to issue the rule or otherwise take the governmental action; it may lack the power to do
so, when private parties and other agencies have the political power to stop the agency
from achieving its goals. In such cases, agency "control" over a rulemaking is more illu-
sory than real.
107. Several fairly senior agency officials from diverse agencies have opined informally
that they think there is less substantive guidance within this administration than in its
predecessors. Mid-to-senior level career officials therefore feel more vulnerable about hav-
ing their decisions second-guessed. They are simply not sure what will be acceptable and
hence are reluctant to engage in a dialogue if it leads to a commitment, since they
would then have to sell it to their managers.
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cussed above," s many of the benefits of the process are lost by
this change.
VI. THE DIFFICULTY WITH EVALUATIONS
Alas, this mathematician turned lawyer finds himself a cur-
mudgeon with respect to the evaluation of reg negs and other
consensual processes. My concern surely does not stem from a fear
that reg negs will not hold their own or that other consensus
building procedures will not prove beneficial when compared to
their adversarial counterparts. Rather, it stems from the difficulty
of developing a suitable measure for "as compared to what." Reg
negs are intense activities: participating in one can be expen-
sive"° and time-consuming, and requires participants to make
hard choices.10 Since a reg neg is such a focused activity, it is
relatively easy to tally the expenses and time involved in participa-
tion. Conventional notice-and-comment rulemaking for significant
rules, on the other hand, is far more diffuse. These rulemakings
extend over a longer period and people tend not to keep score
nearly as carefully. Thus, the data on which to base comparisons is
likely to be flawed. Moreover, there is a real difficulty in compar-
ing two rules in being sure that you are measuring differences in
the process and not differences in the underlying politics of the
matter. My concern, therefore, has been that analysts would seize
on the hard numbers, which would look high, without considering
fully what goes on in a routine rulemaking. We have also seen
repeated examples of an agency's staff forgetting that an issue has
been on its docket for a very long time, all the while incurring
time and expense. Further, agencies often use reg neg for atypical
rulemakings precisely because they fear the rule will not get done
in a reasonable time.
Neff Kerwin and Laura Langbein's study of reg negs at EPA
should help address this concern."' They conducted many inter-
108. See supra Part III.E-F.
109. See KERWiN & LANGBEIN, supra note 47, at 35 ("Participation in negotiated
rulemaking emerges as quite costly, with the impact appearing to fall disproportionately
on smaller organizations."). Indeed, finding ways to defray some of the costs of participa-
tion is a major challenge of many reg negs.
110. See Ellen Siegler, Regulatory Negotiations: A Practical Perspective, Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,647, 10,650 (Oct. 1992).
111. See KERWiN & LANGBEIN, supra note 47, at 47-48. Note, however, that Kerwin
and Langbein say that these results are tentative, and that conclusions cannot really be
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views of the participants in reg negs and have identified a number
of rules that they regard as "similar" enough to merit compari-
son.' Their final report should be enormously helpful.
In my skepticism over evaluations, it never occurred to me
that the bean counters would count the wrong beans, but I fear
that is what has happened in Professor Coglianese's study.
Rulemaking is an inherently political activity; to understand a
negotiated rulemaking, both the political setting in which it operat-
ed and the internal dynamics around the rule itself must be exam-
ined. Unfortunately, many of the empirical observations are too
limited to be of much value is assessing the merit of reg negs.
First, Professor Coglianese observes that reg negs have only
been used for a tiny fraction of all rules." He sees this lack of
pervasiveness as an indicator that the reg neg process itself is
flawed. Rather, the process needs to be put in perspective. It is
unquestionably an intense process, and hence it should be used
only in those instances in which its benefits merit the expenditure
of the resources:" 4 issues that are complex and controversial, but
nevertheless negotiable."' These are the rules that so often stall
an agency while the political forces work their will. A reg neg pro-
vides a forum for those forces so that while developing the rule,
the committee is also developing a political consensus. At any
given time, there are not likely to be many issues within that
category. Reg neg is a tool that should only be used in appropri-
ate situations. Hammers and screwdrivers are used far more than
socket wrenches, but those wrenches form an essential part of any
worker's toolbox. This both explains the relatively sparse use of
reg neg and the reason many of the rules that have been the
subject of reg negs take a long time-they are the big ones.
The primary measurement of the reg negs is also fundamen-
tally flawed. One cannot simply count days without any under-
standing of where a reg neg fits into the overall rulemaking pro-
cess and purport to understand anything about reg negs them-
selves. It was interesting to see the long periods between initiation
drawn until Phase Two of their study is completed. See id-
112. See id. at 2.
113. See Coglianese, supra note 49, at 1274-78.
114. It would therefore not be appropriate to use reg neg for run-of-the-mill type
cases.
115. For instance, in the current political environment, it would be futile to attempt to
negotiate an agreement on virtually any aspect of the abortion issue.
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of the rulemaking and its final Federal Register notice in some of
the reg negs that he lists," 6 and the observation certainly forces
one to ask what is going on. Unfortunately, that question was
neither asked nor answered by Professor Coglianese. The answer
again is the political setting of the process. For example, the Coast
Guard decided to use negotiated rulemaking after its initial hear-
ing on an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (when the clock
had started running) precisely because it encountered such high
seas: the level of controversy over the proposal was significant
indeed and the deadline was short. The committee it empaneled
came up with a solution in record time, and the Coast Guard met
its schedule; the interim rule was later incorporated into another,
broader rule (note the clock is still ticking). Thus, the time-clock
evaluation is meaningless in light of the actual process."7
Appendix B provides an explanation for all but one of the reg
negs in Professor Coglianese's table that took more than 1,000
days. When one goes beyond the docket sheets and understands
what actually happened in those proceedings, the only conclusion
can be that reg neg is a powerful process indeed. His analysis
does, however, raise several important issues: why is it that some
agency staff feel so threatened by commitment when in fact partic-
ipating in a negotiation can actually lead to better solutions? And,
why is it that OSHA's staff regularly takes 18 months to review a
consensus?
CONCLUSION: WHAT IS THE GRADE?
It is currently popular to talk in terms of consensus and of
public involvement, in terms of "public-private partnerships," and
of community involvement. Properly executed, these processes can
greatly expand an agency's knowledge and insight into an issue on
which it must act, expedite the agency's work by highlighting the
contentious issues to which the agency can devote its resources,
116. See Coglianese, supra note 49, at 1281 tbl.3.
117. If one wanted an even more extreme example, the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion had published two Notices of Proposed Rulemakings on Flight and Duty Time, but
was not able to issue the rule. The FAA turned to reg neg, largely in desperation, and
was successful. Counting only the days from the first to the last notice would conceal the
contribution of reg neg to its resolution and make the process appear very long. This
assertion is supported by many discussions between the author and Neil Eisner, Assistant




lead those affected to accept decisions they might otherwise op-
pose, develop political support for decisions that would be played
out in many fora, and resolve specific issues that would otherwise
end up in court or Congress. The resulting regulatory actions often
are more creative and subject the issues to more stringent scrutiny
at lower costs than actions taken through more traditional means.
In short, the regulatory actions are often simply better by virtually
any measure. These are, indeed, powerful tools.
A number of new approaches have been tried, and proven
approaches have been tinkered with in an attempt to see what is
necessary and what is not. These processes clearly work best when
those implementing them pay close attention to the factors that
have emerged from a generation of experience. To secure their
wider endorsement, it will be necessary to convince the agency
program managers that it is in their interest to be full participants
in processes that lead to a commitment. Program managers must
realize that through consensus processes, they learn a huge amount
and can develop extraordinarily sophisticated decisions that other-
wise would not be within reach. Without this support, unfortunate-
ly, these potentially powerful tools will not be fully used and those
used in their stead do not have nearly the same benefits.
Perhaps just as adolescents shy from commitment but soon
emerge from their hesitancy to undertake wholesome relationships,
so too will the current experience with processes that are short of
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This was only a partial reg neg: the
agency initially sanctioned it, but later
refused to participate or even formally
acknowledge a connection with the
dialogue and its rule. OSHA itself
announced an ambitious schedule for
developing the standard and missed its
deadline by years; the reg neg had no
effect on that delay. It should be noted,
however, that the OSHA staff has said
the committee's deliberations were
very helpful and, importantly, it should
also be recognized that the benzene
standard was OSHA's first major
health standard that did not result in
immediate judicial review.
The reg neg itself only lasted 3 or 4
months before the farmworker contin-
gent walked out, thereby ending the reg
neg. Thus, the remainder of the time
was spent developing a rule through
traditional means, not by a reg neg.
This proves the opposite thesis. More-
over, one should compare the draft rule
that was on the table when the reg neg
ended with what ultimately emerged
from the agency; it was far more pro-
tective. Finally, EPA has said it
learned an extraordinary amount dur-
ing the process that influenced its
entire regulatory approach in the area.
The reg neg committee reported out an
agreement in punctual time. Internal
OSHA analysis has shown that both
the time and cost involved in develop-
ing this standard was roughly half that
of a very similar standard developed by
conventional means. The extraordi-
nary time involved was consumed by
internal OSHA review of the consen-
sus that was reached in the reg neg.
That review was quite controversial
Nonconformance Penalties
Emergency Pesticide Exemptions






Underground Injection of Hazard-
ous Wastes
RCRA Permit Modifications
DOT/FAA Nondiscrimination on basis of
handicap in air travel




Education Assistance to meet special ed.
needs
Equipment leaks The equipment leaks regulation was
part of the broader rule governing haz-
ardous organic chemicals, known as
the HON (Hazardous Organic National
Emission Standard for Hazardous Air
Pollutants). This part of the rule was
completed years before the rest and
simply had to await the other parts
COMMENT
among the participants and was largely
attributed to a strong case of "not-
invented-here." The delay did not stem
from the reg neg. Indeed, a very simi-
lar phenomenon is occurring at the
moment with respect to the steel erec-
tion-Subpart R-standard.
This reg neg did not reach agreement
because of a fundamental disagreement
over the interpretation of the underly-
ing statute that required an authorita-
tive decision by the DC Circuit to
resolve; that dispute was known from
the outset and the parties attempted to
negotiate around it, but in the end the
differences needed to be resolved. The
rule EPA published was developed in
the reg neg.
This committee did not reach agree-
ment, so that the long delay is attribu-
table to the agency itself - or rather
the two agencies since they disagreed
with one another - working out the
reg, not to the committee. It should be
noted that many of the parties to this
reg neg subsequently requested DOT to
use reg neg to develop future rules of
interest to them, precisely because they
thought it was effective.
This case resulted in judicial review of
the rule. The committee did not agree,
however, not to seek review, so the









before it was published. There is testi-
mony, however, that most firms were
complying with the rule long before it
was in effect. Any delay here was
caused by the traditional process, not
reg neg.
Once the committee got involved in the
issue, everyone realized it was far more
complex than originally believed.
Thus much greater effort was needed to
craft the rule. Note also that the sub-
ject is related to the now prominent
issue of mad cow disease.
Education Perkins vocational & applied tech-
nology regulations
Transportation for individuals with
disabilities
Clean Fuels (Oxygenated and
Reformulated Gasoline)
Coast Guard Oil spill response plans
The committee completed its work in
an incredibly short time given the mag-
nitude of the task. During the Presi-
dential campaign, however, the Bush
administration was pressured to change
the proposed rule from the one devel-
oped by the committee; then the next
administration changed the proposal
further. Thus, the delay came not from
the committee but from political direc-
tives to change it. No rulemaking, be it
reg neg or otherwise, is fully immune
from the political process. The judicial
review stemmed from the fact that the
final rule was not as proposed by the
committee; the difficulty with the
WTO is with the statute; neither come
from the reg neg. Indeed, the fact that
the rule was negotiated helped ward off
additional changes.
This enormously complex undertaking
was convened because the Coast Guard
had to issue a binding rule in a very
short period. From the publication of a
notice of intent to form a committee to
a NPRM was a little over 6 months; an
interim final rule was in place in
another 6 months. This is an extraordi-
narily short schedule. Portions of the









were not the subject of the negotia-
tions, however, and proceeded by nor-
mal rulemaking; once they were
completed - years later - the interim
final rule was incorporated into the
overall scheme. Far from delay, this
rule proves that reg neg can be an
expeditious process.
Coke ovens
Non-voice, low earth orbit satel-
lites
Assessment and apportionment of
expenses
Higher Education Amendments of
1992
Disinfectant byproducts The reg neg itself lasted only 6 months
before an agreement in principle was
reached; EPA took a year to craft the
agreement into an 800-page NPRM
which was then signed by the commit-
tee. Given the magnitude of the
NPRM and of the scientific contro-
versy surrounding this issue, comple-
tion of the process in the less than four








Education Guaranty agency reserves
Education Helping disadvantaged students
HHS/DOI Indian self-determination HUD
Coast Guard Chicago drawbridge operations
This rule was subject to judicial
review, but the rule as issued was not
as recommended by the committee.
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